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BORDERS AND CROSSROADS: COMPARATIVE
PERSPECTIVES ON MINORITIES AND CONFLICT OF LAWS
Pascale Fournier*
INTRODUCTION
Millions of immigrants from Muslim countries have entered Western
borders in the past decades, bringing with them specific religious traditions and
social mores. In accordance with the conflict of laws1 rules of many
continental European legal systems, such as France and Germany, the courts of
the host country apply the law of the parties’ nationality (lex patriae) in
matters relating to marriage and divorce. Under such regimes, Muslim parties
involved in family law disputes may be subject to the law of their country of
origin. This makes for striking results when applied to individuals who may
have lived in a Western European country for decades but have not taken on
the citizenship of that country, whether by choice or impossibility.
Furthermore, it may generate questionable outcomes for immigrants who have
chosen to leave their countries of origin specifically to avoid being judged
against conservative interpretations of Islamic law.
In contrast, common law jurisdictions, such as Canada, apply the law of
domicile (lex domicilii) in matters of personal status, regardless of the parties’
nationality. This is often touted as a principled alternative to lex patriae
continental solutions, as it allows newcomers and immigrants to benefit from
Western legal systems’ guarantees of gender equality.2 The application of lex
patriae is often denounced as hampering liberal divorce policies.3 Moreover,
some scholars describe the lex domicilii model as more mindful of actual ties

* Associate Professor and Vice-Dean Research, Faculty of Law, University of Ottawa. I am grateful for
funding received to support this project from the Quebec Bar Foundation and the Social Sciences and
Humanities Research Council of Canada. I thank Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na’im, M. Christian Green, and John
Witte, Jr. for their fabulous initiative, and Pascal McDougall, Anna Dekker, and Aida Setrakian for their
invaluable contributions.
1 Throughout this Essay, I refer to rules of conflict of laws, international private law, and private
international law, formulations used in Canada, Germany, and France respectively.
2 See Veronika Gaertner, European Choice of Law Rules in Divorce (Rome III): An Examination of the
Possible Connecting Factors in Divorce Matters Against the Background of Private International Law
Developments, 2 J. PRIVATE INT’L L. 99, 122 (2006).
3 FRIEDRICH K. JUENGER, CHOICE OF LAW AND MULTISTATE JUSTICE 220 (Special ed. 2005).
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between the litigants and the legal system applied,4 more respectful of the
parties’ will,5 and more efficient in terms of social integration mechanisms.6
Finally, this solution allows women to fare better or at least more predictably
than in systems that apply the law of citizenship.7 To explore these
propositions, the experiences of Muslim women navigating the process of
Islamic marriage and divorce in Canada are presented, with a particular focus
on the Islamic dower (Mahr) and the repudiation (Talaq) divorce. I review the
academic literature and the case law, and present the experiences of divorced
Muslim women in Canada whom I interviewed over the course of my
fieldwork in three Canadian cities.8 At times, I bring these perspectives
together in the person of “Leila,” a fictional Muslim woman divorcing her
husband, “Samir,” to portray how these legal rules might play out.
I start with an overview of Islamic law pertaining to marriage and divorce,
before presenting brief French and German case studies, which underline the
absurdities created by the continental model of conflict of laws, in light of both
countries’ immigration policies. Subsequently, I examine whether the
Canadian designation of the lex domicilii really does lead to more predictable
and just results for Muslim women. In doing so, I try to outline how the
institutions of Muslim marriage and divorce can be articulated in contractual
terms, emphasizing that regardless of the legal traditions and laws applicable—
that is, the “law in books”—individual agency and power bargains sometimes
modify the expected results into the “law in action,” blurring the lines between
Western legal systems and Islamic institutions and norms. I argue that formal
designation of Western law as the sole governing legal system, in the face of
mass legal transplantation, may at times be rendered essentially meaningless.

4 BERNARD SCHNEIDER, LE DOMICILE INTERNATIONAL [THE INTERNATIONAL DOMICILE] 35–36 (1973)
(Switz.); Thalia Kruger, The Family: A State of the Art 5 (RELIGARE, Working Paper No. 2, 2010), available
at http://www.religareproject.eu/system/files/WP3_State_of_the_art_on_The_Family_e-version_0.pdf.
5 PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW IN COMMON LAW CANADA 120 (Nicholas Rafferty et al. eds., 2d ed.
2003); Friedrich K. Juenger, Marital Property and the Conflict of Laws: A Tale of Two [Countries], 81
COLUM. L. REV. 1061, 1071–72 (1981).
6 Leslie K. Thiele, The German Marital Property System: Conflict of Laws in Dual-Nationality
Marriage, 12 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 78, 105 (1982).
7 See Michael Bogdan & Eva Ryrstedt, Marriage in Swedish Family Law and Swedish Conflicts of Law,
29 FAM. L.Q. 675, 680–81 (1995). The law of lex domicilii is argued to be safer for women than lex patriae,
which can lead to multiple applicable legal systems. See id.
8 See infra note 82 and accompanying text.
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I. THE STARTING POINT: ISLAMIC FAMILY LAW
Let us consider for a moment the Islamic legal institutions as they stand
before their travel to Western courts.9 Under Islamic law, marriage establishes
a reciprocity system in which each party is assigned a set of contractual rights,
each of which will confer a duty toward the other party. An Islamic marriage
contract can only be concluded through the principles of offer (ijab) and
acceptance (qabul) by the two principals or their proxies.10 Upon marriage, the
husband acquires the right to the wife’s obedience to him and the right to her
sexual availability.11 The wife acquires the right to her Mahr12 and the right to
maintenance.13 Mahr is the expression used in Islamic family law to describe
the “payment that the wife is entitled to receive from the husband in
consideration of the marriage.”14
The three types of Islamic divorce, Talaq, Khul, and Faskh, determine the
degree to which each party may initiate divorce and the different costs
associated with such transaction. According to classical Islamic family law,
women can initiate the Khul or Faskh divorces, but may not use the Talaq. The
Khul divorce is introduced judicially and usually involves the return of the
Mahr to the husband.15 The Faskh divorce is a fault-based divorce initiated by
the wife before the court, and it is by nature limited to specific grounds.16 In
the case of termination of marriage by Faskh divorce, the wife is entitled to
Mahr.17 The Talaq divorce is a unilateral act, which dissolves the marriage
contract through the declaration of the husband only. The law recognizes the
power of the husband to divorce his wife by saying “Talaq” three times
without any need for him to ask for the enforcement of his declaration by the
9 In past work, I emphasized that Islamic law institutions such as Mahr bear no uniformity in Islamic
legal systems. See, e.g., PASCALE FOURNIER, MUSLIM MARRIAGE IN WESTERN COURTS: LOST IN
TRANSPLANTATION (2010). Indeed, I present here the classical form of Islamic divorce, but Sharia law has
developed in the widely diverging contexts of forty-seven Muslim majority countries. Thus, one must bear in
mind that the very place of departure of Mahr is inherently plural. Id. at 29.
10 See JAMAL J. NASIR, THE ISLAMIC LAW OF PERSONAL STATUS 45 (3d ed. 2002).
11 See id. at 98.
12 MUHAMMAD JAWAD MAGHNIYYAH, THE FIVE SCHOOLS OF ISLAMIC LAW: AL-HANAFI, AL-HANBALI,
AL-JA’FARI, AL-MALIKI, AL-SHAFI’I 311–12 (2003).
13 NASIR, supra note 10, at 98.
14 JOHN L. ESPOSITO WITH NATANA J. DELONG-BAS, WOMEN IN MUSLIM FAMILY LAW 23 (2d ed. 2001).
Mahr is generally payable in part upon marriage (prompt Mahr), with the rest due upon divorce (deferred
Mahr). See also WAEL B. HALLAQ, SHARĪ‘A: THEORY, PRACTICE, TRANSFORMATIONS 277 (2009).
15 DAWOUD EL ALAMI & DOREEN HINCHCLIFFE, ISLAMIC MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE LAWS OF THE ARAB
WORLD 27–28 (1996).
16 Id. at 29–31.
17 Id. at 32.
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court.18 What comes with this unlimited “freedom” of the husband to divorce
at will is the (costly) obligation to pay Mahr in full as soon as the third Talaq
has been pronounced.19
II. LEX PATRIAE AND CONTINENTAL PARADOXES
Islamic legal institutions regularly travel to Western countries through
conflict of laws rules, for example when the foreign law of Islamic countries is
designated as applicable to a legal dispute. This Part explores how France and
Germany continue to apply the law of the individual’s citizenship, all the while
pursuing respectively assimilationist- and jus sanguinis-inspired immigration
policies. I end this Part by presenting a fictional script of “Leila,” a Muslim
woman going through a divorce in Germany, to ponder the impacts of the
continental European model.
A. FRANCE: The République and Its Ordre Public
In matters of family law and in relation to disputes over the status and
capacity of persons, French courts must apply the laws of a foreigner’s country
of citizenship. This regime stems from French private international law rules20
and bilateral agreements concluded with various countries.21 This is only true
insofar as applying the foreign legal system does not contravene French ordre
public,22 but the onus for proving this infringement is considerably heavy.23

18

Id. at 22–23.
JOSEPH SCHACHT, AN INTRODUCTION TO ISLAMIC LAW 167 (1982); see also N.J. COULSON, A
HISTORY OF ISLAMIC LAW 207–08 (1964); JUDITH E. TUCKER, WOMEN IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY EGYPT 54
(1985).
20 1 GÉRALD GOLDSTEIN & ETHEL GROFFIER, DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVÉ: THÉORIE GÉNÉRALE
[PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW: GENERAL THEORY] 67–68 (1998) (Can.); Ali Mezghani, Le juge français et
les institutions du droit musulman [The French Judge and the Institutions of Islamic Law], 130 JOURNAL DU
DROIT INTERNATIONAL [J. INT’L L.] 721, 733 (2003) (Fr.).
21 See, e.g., Convention entre la République Française et le Royaume du Maroc relative au statut des
personnes et de la famille et à la coopération judiciaire, May 27, 1983, Fr.-Morocco, JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA
RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], June 1, 1983, p. 1643.
22 This can be roughly translated to “public policy” and refers to the fundamental principles of a given
legal system. See generally Rémy Libchaber, L’exception d’ordre public en droit international privé [The
Exception of Ordre Public in Private International Law], in L’ORDRE PUBLIC À LA FIN DU XXE SIÈCLE
[L’ORDRE PUBLIC AT THE END OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY] 65 (Thierry Revet ed., 1996) (discussing
generally the exception to ordre public in French private international law).
23 Under French law, the threshold to render foreign law inapplicable is higher than the threshold to
render domestic law unconscionable. YVON LOUSSOUARN ET AL., DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVÉ [PRIVATE
INTERNATIONAL LAW] 359–60 (9th ed. 2007) (Fr.).
19
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These rules must be analyzed in light of France’s immigration policy and
cultural context, specifically with respect to French neorepublican discourse
and policies, according to which membership in the national community
requires an absolute commitment to the Republic and to the core values of
equality (égalité) and the separation of state and religion (laïcité).24 This
radical republican model highly discourages the formation of “communities”
of immigrants.25 Indeed, France does not allow the state to officially support
any exemption or special representation for immigrant or national minorities.
This opposition to religious and cultural difference is so strong that France
formulated a reservation with respect to the right to cultural, religious, and
linguistic autonomy protected by Article 27 of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights.26 It is through this ideological prism that France
manages one of the most numerically significant Muslim minorities in Western
Europe. As a result, taking up the French nationality may very well be
unappealing or difficult for newcomers and indeed, it is estimated that only
half of the five million Muslims living in France have obtained French
nationality.27 Hence, faced with matters of private law involving Muslims who
are living in France under the citizenship of a Muslim state, French judges
have had to apply various Islamic legal institutions.
B. GERMANY: The Plight of the Ausländer
Let us now consider the German model, which displays some glaring
similarities with France. Stipulations of both German international private

24 Michael F. Leruth, The Neorepublican Discourse on French National Identity, FR. POL. & SOC’Y, Fall
1998, at 46, 49.
25 William Safran, State, Nation, National Identity, and Citizenship: France As a Test Case, 12 INT’L
POL. SCI. REV. 219, 221 (1991).
26 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, MULTILATERAL TREATIES DEPOSITED WITH THE
SECRETARY-GENERAL, ch. IV, § 4, p. 6, available at http://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/MTDSG/Volume%
20I/Chapter%20IV/IV-4.en.pdf.
27 JONATHAN LAURENCE & JUSTIN VAISSE, INTEGRATING ISLAM: POLITICAL AND RELIGIOUS
CHALLENGES IN CONTEMPORARY FRANCE 1 (2006). In 2005, the Muslim population of France was estimated
at five million. Mayanthi L. Fernando, Reconfiguring Freedom: Muslim Piety and the Limits of Secular Law
and Public Discourse in France, 37 AM. ETHNOLOGIST 19, 21 (2010); Muslims in Europe: Country Guide,
BBC, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4385768.stm#france (last updated Dec. 23, 2005). Estimates vary, but
studies show that the numbers could be as high as six million, making France the Western European country
with one of the highest proportions of Muslims. See FORUM ON RELIGION & PUB. LIFE, PEW RESEARCH CTR.,
MAPPING THE GLOBAL MUSLIM POPULATION: A REPORT ON THE SIZE AND DISTRIBUTION OF THE WORLD’S
MUSLIM POPULATION 21 n.7 (2009), available at http://pewforum.org/uploadedfiles/Orphan_Migrated_
Content/Muslimpopulation.pdf.
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law28 and bilateral agreements29 provide that it is not the law of domicile but
rather the law of the parties’ citizenship that is applicable in matters of family
law. Here again, this general principle is subject to German “public policy.”30
These international private law rules must be considered with reference to
Germany’s immigration policy, which contributes significantly to the impacts
the laws have on Muslim immigrants. Indeed, Germany has historically
characterized itself as a nation based on common-blood descent that resists the
integration of culturally different individuals and groups.31 The Volk-centered
idea of German nationhood is based on the principle of citizenship by blood
(jus sanguinis) and emphasizes the significance of ancestry. Accordingly, until
1999, a citizenship applicant had to provide evidence of at least one German
ancestor to receive German citizenship, making it almost impossible for many
foreigners (ausländer) to become citizens.32 In addition to struggling to obtain
individual citizenship, German Muslims, not unlike their French counterparts,
are denied collective recognition, having tried and failed to obtain the legal
status of “public law corporation” for their religious communities since the
early 1970s.33 In this social context, immigrants are often discouraged, if not
28 See BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] [CIVIL CODE], Aug. 18, 1896, BUNDESGESETZBLATT, Teil 1
[BGBL. I] p. 2494, ch. 2, § 3, arts. 13–14 (Ger.); GERHARD ROBBERS, AN INTRODUCTION TO GERMAN LAW 306
(Michael Jewell trans., 4th ed. 2006); Mathias Rohe, On the Applicability of Islamic Rules in Germany and
Europe, 3 EUR. Y.B. MINORITY ISSUES 181, 184 (2003–2004).
29 For instance, Iran and Germany have ratified a treaty that ensures the application of Iranian personal
status law for Iranian citizens in Germany and vice versa for German citizens residing in Iran. See
Niederlassungsabkommen zwischen dem Deutschen Reich und dem Kaiserreich Persien [Settlement
Agreement Between the German Reich and the Empire of Persia], Feb. 17, 1929, reprinted in BGBL. I at 829
(Ger.).
30 The application of foreign law runs contrary to public policy when its application has effects that
“[are] obviously incompatible with, for example, the main principles of German law.” Rohe, supra note 28, at
185. This notion includes human rights enshrined in the Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany. See
GRUNDGESETZ FÜR DIE BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND [GRUNDESETZ] [GG] [BASIC LAW], May 23, 1949
BGBl. I at art. 3 (Ger.).
31 See ROGERS BRUBAKER, CITIZENSHIP AND NATIONHOOD IN FRANCE AND GERMANY 82 (1992).
32 Staatsangehörigkeitsgesetz [StAG] [Nationality Act], July 15, 1999, BGBL. III at 102, § 40a (Ger.);
see also GG at art 116. Germany’s citizenship policy has thus been described as “one of the most restrictive in
the EU.” Simon Green, Between Ideology and Pragmatism: The Politics of Dual Nationality in Germany, 39
INT’L MIGRATION REV. 921, 922 (2005). Even with the 1993 and 1999 amendments to Germany’s Nationality
Act, which made possible the process of naturalization on the basis of long-term residency or of birth in
Germany, German law maintains great hostility towards double citizenship, and imposes stricter conditions
than most European countries on the legal status of the parents of the children applying for German
citizenship. Marc Morjé Howard, The Causes and Consequences of Germany’s New Citizenship Law, 17 GER.
POL. 41, 53 (2008).
33 Mathias Rohe, The Legal Treatment of Muslims in Germany, in THE LEGAL TREATMENT OF ISLAMIC
MINORITIES IN EUROPE 83, 87 (Roberta Aluffi B.-P. & Giovanna Zincone eds., 2004). The “public law
corporation” constitutional status provides entitlements such as the right to levy taxes from members of the
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precluded, from acquiring German citizenship, making the application of the
law of their countries of nationality almost inevitable. Moreover, as Dr.
Christina Jones-Pauly suggests, because many residents “are not aware of the
rule that their own foreign law applies to [them as] foreigners, it can come as a
rude shock for some when they have marital disputes.”34
In a past article,35 I depicted the fictional couple of “Samir” and “Leila,”
gathering inspiration from case law, novels, and my personal encounters to
illustrate how Muslim parties play out the contradictions in the adjudication of
Mahr and strategize upon them. I now allude to one of these fictional
characters to illustrate possible impacts of continental European conflict of
laws.
C. Leila, the German-Iranian “Foreign Bride”36
Leila has been married to Samir for fifteen years. Although of Iranian
origin and citizenship, she lives in Kreuzberg, a Turkish Muslim section of
Berlin. She rarely goes out or makes contact with her German neighbors.
When she does go out, she is more hesitant than her sons and her husband. At
home, men often gather to talk about politics, the war in Afghanistan, the
disastrous state of Iraq, and the integration of Turkey into the European Union,
while women cook, assist, and clean—mute shadows, outsiders. In recent
years, Leila has been exposed to the new wave of feminist critiques coming
from German women of Muslim background, such as Seyran Ateş’ Great
Journey Into Fire37 and Necla Kelek’s The Foreign Bride.38 In their works,

community and to organize a parish, among others. Id.; see also Pascale Fournier & Jens Pierre Urban, La
régulation des morts par le droit allemand: L’au-delà comporte-t-il des privilégiés? [The Regulation of the
Dead by German Law: The Beyond Has Privileges?], in LES CARRÉS DE L’ISLAM EN EUROPE [THE SQUARE OF
ISLAM IN EUROPE] 13 (Atmane Aggoun ed., 2010) (discussing the possibility of German Muslim communities
managing their own funeral rites and cemeteries and the resulting discursive and subjective implications).
34 Christina Jones-Pauly, Marriage Contracts of Muslims in the Diaspora: Problems in the Recognition
of Mahr Contracts in German Law, in THE ISLAMIC MARRIAGE CONTRACT: CASE STUDIES IN ISLAMIC FAMILY
LAW 299, 300 (Asifa Quaraishi & Frank E. Vogel eds., 2008).
35 Pascale Fournier, Flirting with God in Western Secular Courts: Mahr in the West, 24 INT’L J.L. POL’Y
& FAM. 1 (2010) [hereinafter Fournier, Flirting with God]. A French translation of the article has appeared as
Courtiser Dieu devant les tribunaux occidentaux, 25 CAN. J.L. & SOC’Y 167 (2010).
36 This script is partly based on a 1980 German decision from the Higher Regional Court of Bremen and
the autobiography of Necla Kelek. See NECLA KELEK, DIE FREMDE BRAUT: EIN BERICHT AUS DEM INNEREN
DES TÜRKISCHEN LEBENS IN DEUTSCHLAND [THE FOREIGN BRIDE: A REPORT FROM THE INNER LIFE OF
TURKISH IN GERMANY] (2005) (Ger.).
37 SEYRAN ATEŞ, GROßE REISE INS FEUER: DIE GESCHICHTE EINER DEUTSCHEN TÜRKIN [GREAT
JOURNEY INTO FIRE: THE STORY OF A GERMAN TURK] (2008) (Ger.).
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both authors address the everyday violence of arranged marriages as well as
the oppressive and sexist behavior of Muslim men in Germany. Leila was
powerfully seduced by their critique and the promising and asserting voice
they developed. She saw herself as the “Foreign Bride,” this young Muslim
woman imported to Germany as a bride, who lead a fully insular and
subservient life as a wife and a mother. This book represented an ultimatum for
Leila: she would either embrace women’s rights (and other Western, German
conceptions of freedom) or remain forever a “foreign bride” whose equality is
constantly jeopardized. Leila opted for the former. She left Samir, her sons, her
home—with perfect irresponsibility.39
Faced with the impossibility of surviving with very limited economic
resources, Leila reached the courthouse, confident that alimony and divisionof-property laws in Germany would guarantee her generous benefits. How
wrong were her predictions! Leila soon realized that, as a non-German citizen,
Iranian Islamic law would apply to her case! Under Iranian Islamic law, she
had no claim to post-divorce alimony or to a share of the matrimonial property;
the court held that Mahr constituted a substitute for post-divorce maintenance
and division of the surplus of marital profits. Furthermore, because Leila was
the one seeking the divorce, the court held that she had given up her right to
deferred Mahr and was obligated to pay back the “prompt Mahr” she had been
given at her wedding. Leila felt trapped in a complex and seemingly
incomprehensible reality. Would Leila have divorced Samir had she known
that she would obtain Mahr and only Mahr upon divorce? Was Leila fooled
into thinking that she, too, could embrace German conceptions of freedom, as
the book so delightfully suggested? Is Leila forever condemned, by virtue of
the application of international private law rules in Germany, to represent the
tragic “Foreign Bride” that she so desperately hoped to escape?
For some, these continental applications of the lex patriae are inevitably
hurtful to women.40 Indeed, save discharging the heavy onus of demonstrating
38 KELEK, supra note 36. In her book, Kelek strongly criticizes both the “fundamentalist Muslim society”
for perpetuating a culture of female slavery and the liberal German society, which in her opinion has adopted a
hands-off approach based on tolerance. See id.
39 I borrow this expression from Ralph Ellison’s Invisible Man, in which he argues that irresponsibility
is, for subordinated groups, a consequence of their invisibility. RALPH ELLISON, INVISIBLE MAN (1952).
40 I have composed a series of fictional scripts of “Leilas” from Germany, France, Canada, and the
United States to illustrate that enforcement (and non-enforcement) of Mahr can be at times disempowering and
at others empowering to Muslim women. One of my scripts was based on a French case and envisioned Leila
using the French ordre public exception to her advantage. Fournier, Flirting with God, supra note 35, at 90;
see also Cour d’appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Douai, 1e civ., Apr. 4, 1978, Bull. civ. I, No. 137, 110
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that “public policy” is contravened, women may well be “abandoned” by
Western states to conservative interpretations of Islamic law, through the
combined operation of harsh immigration policies in France and Germany and
the strict application of the lex patriae principle. Are immigrants who are
willing to integrate into Western notions of the family prevented from doing
so? Given that domicile, unlike nationality, does not depend on the approval of
the state and can be established by the mere will of the parties,41 be they
foreigners or nationals,42 should it not be systematically preferred to the lex
patriae, as a principled humanitarian alternative? I now turn to the Canadian
example to explore this proposition.
III. LEX DOMICILII AND THE CANADIAN ENTANGLEMENT
By virtue of Canadian conflict of laws rules, the principle of lex domicilii
governs the validity and the effects of marriages.43 Moreover, for the core
issues of the enactment of divorce and its possible grounds, over which the
Parliament has jurisdiction, Canadian choice of law rules go as far as making
the principle of lex fori (federal Canadian law) systematically applicable,
regardless of domicile and citizenship.44 This apparently rigid and predictable
system leads to puzzling results; at times, Canadian judges used “the secular”
(Fr.). The present Essay similarly addresses the plural and contradictory outcomes legal migrations can
produce.
41 1 JANET WALKER & JEAN-GABRIEL CASTEL, CANADIAN CONFLICT OF LAWS § 4.7, at 4–5 (6th ed.
2011).
42 PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW IN COMMON LAW CANADA, supra note 5, at 133.
43 See id. at 119. In asserting jurisdiction over these aspects of marriage, the various provinces render
their legislative regimes applicable to immigrants as soon as they acquire domicile in the province. Even
Quebec, which applies civil law and in which private international law has strong continental inclinations,
applies the principle of lex domicilii to matters of personal status and the effects of marriage. Civil Code of
Québec, S.Q. 1991, c. 64, arts. 3083, 3088, 3089 (Can.). Quebec courts apply the principle of lex patriae only
in extremely rare instances. See CLAUDE EMANUELLI, DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVÉ QUÉBÉCOIS [QUEBEC
PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW] 59 (2d ed. 2006) (Can.). Article 3123 of the Civil Code of Québec applies to
the spouses’ matrimonial property the law of the “domicile at the time of their marriage,” a connecting factor
that seems inspired by the lex patriae solution and may amount to the same result in the case of Muslim
immigrants. Civil Code of Québec, art. 3123. That being said, there are strong indications from the Québec
Court of Appeal that this provision addresses an insignificant part of Quebec matrimonial property:
“matrimonial regime[s]” covered by Articles 431 through 447 of the Civil Code, and not the “family
patrimony” regime of Articles 414 through 426. See H.O. c. C.B., 2001 CarswellQue 2770, paras. 57–59 (Can.
Que. C.A.) (WL); G.B. c. C.C., [2001] R.J.Q. 1435 (Can. Que. C.A.). Thus, most of matrimonial property
would be governed by the principle of lex domicilii as per Article 3089 of the Civil Code. Civil Code of
Québec, art. 3089.
44 J.G. Castel, Canadian Private International Law Rules Relating to Domestic Relations, 5 MCGILL L.J.
1, 15 (1958–1959); EMANUELLI, supra note 43, at 292. This rule is argued to make for more judicial certainty.
See PETER NORTH, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW PROBLEMS IN COMMON LAW JURISDICTIONS 68–70 (1993).
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to render highly “religious” outcomes and invoked “the religious” to produce
“secular” outcomes. Part III.A presents examples of judicial recognition and
incorporation of Islamic law into divorces governed by Canadian law. Part
III.B goes beyond the locus of the state to inquire into how the parties
themselves perceive and respond to the interaction between secular and
religious law. I aim to show that designating Canadian law as applicable does
not necessarily make it impermeable to religious law.
A. Canadian Judicial Incorporation of Islamic Law
Islamic legal institutions regularly penetrate the Canadian legal system.
This Subpart reviews Canadian case law which, while applying domestic law,
has at times recognized and enforced Mahr, whether by virtue of its
exceptional religious status or non-exceptional contractual status, and at other
times refused to enforce Mahr precisely because of this religious character. I
aim to demonstrate that in applying domestic law, Canadian courts offer
neither purely secular adjudication nor constancy in their treatment of Islamic
legal institutions.
In Nathoo v. Nathoo45 and N.M.M. v. N.S.M.,46 two cases of the British
Columbia Supreme Court, Mahr is represented as the religious and cultural
expression of the Muslim minority group, one that Canadian society must
respect in the name of multiculturalism.47 Nathoo’s Samir and Leila48 were
both raised in and live within the culture and traditions of the Muslim Ismaili
community in Vancouver.49 When this married couple divorced, both spouses
claimed an order for divorce pursuant to Canada’s federal Divorce Act50 and a
division of family assets arising from their marriage pursuant to the Province
of British Columbia’s Family Relations Act.51 Instead of considering the
enforcement of Mahr as part of family assets, the court began the analysis of
Mahr as a separate “marriage agreement” under Section 48 of the Family
Relations Act.52 Expressing a clear commitment to legal pluralism and
multiculturalism, Justice Dorgan introduced his interpretation of Section 48 of

45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52

Nathoo v. Nathoo, 1996 CarswellBC 2769 (Can. B.C.) (WL).
N.M.M. v. N.S.M., [2004] 26 B.C.L.R. 4th 80 (Can. B.C.).
N.M.M., 26 B.C.L.R. 4th, paras. 26–32; Nathoo, 1996 CarswellBC 2769, para. 25.
The names of the parties have been changed.
Nathoo, 1996 CarswellBC 2769, para. 7.
Divorce Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. L-3 (Can.).
Family Relations Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 128 (Can.).
Nathoo, 1996 CarswellBC 2769, para. 23.
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the Act as one that is “respectful of traditions which define various groups who
live in a multi-cultural community.”53 The voice of the Muslim community, it
was expected, would give meaning to Mahr as a marriage agreement: Samir
and Leila, who “[b]oth attend Mosque regularly and adhere to the tenets of
their faith,”54 agreed on the amount of the Mahr, said the court, “after taking
advice from elders within their community.”55 Having thus redefined the issue
of Mahr as a unique and autonomous domain guided by sacred religious
principles, Justice Dorgan granted Leila the Mahr originally agreed upon in
addition to the awards resulting from the reapportionment of family assets.56
If strictly Canadian family law applied, a “marriage agreement” would
supplant the marital equitable regime; if solely Islamic family law had applied,
Leila would get Mahr and nothing else, besides maintenance during the short
iddah period.57 To reach such an unusual outcome—the enforcement of Mahr
plus the readjusted division of property under the statutory regime—the court
had to frame the issue as a minority rights one: religion is an exceptional field,
it generates its own conception of the good life, and fairness is only an
extension of this particularized vision.58 The court held that the same
contractual principles that governed other secular contracts were not to govern
Muslim marriage agreements, and that under such exceptional treatment the
Mahr agreement in question would be valid.
Interestingly, four years later, in Amlani v. Hirani,59 the British Columbia
Supreme Court dissociated itself from Nathoo in reviewing Mahr as a secular
contract. The court decided that in analyzing the validity of Mahr, it no longer
should inquire into whether the terms of the marriage agreement reflected a
religious intention.60 It simply requires an offer and its acceptance, and does
not involve the question of whether it is deemed essential or merely incidental
to the (Islamic) marriage contract. In Amlani, the court described Mahr as a

53

Id. para. 25.
Id. para. 8.
55 Id. para. 24.
56 Id. para. 27. This conception of Mahr as an exceptional penalty and a valid marriage agreement
distinct from the statutory division of family assets was similarly developed by the British Columbia Supreme
Court. N.M.M., 26 B.C.L.R. 4th, paras. 28–29.
57 See M. AFZAL WANI, THE ISLAMIC LAW ON MAINTENANCE OF WOMEN, CHILDREN PARENTS & OTHER
RELATIVES: CLASSICAL PRINCIPLES AND MODERN LEGISLATIONS IN INDIA AND MUSLIM COUNTRIES 195
(1995).
58 See Nathoo, 1996 CarswellBC 2769, paras. 24–26.
59 Amlani v. Hirani, [2000] 194 D.L.R. 4th 543 (Can. B.C.).
60 Id. paras. 15–16.
54

FOURNIER GALLEYSFINAL2

998

11/18/2011 9:38 AM

EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 25

simple contract rather than a cultural tradition.61 Nevertheless, it is enforceable
and it influences the outcome of the adjudication over (secular) Canadian law.
By contrast, in Kaddoura v. Hammoud,62 the Ontario Court of Justice
refused to recognize Mahr on the basis of the authenticity and purity of Islamic
law. Consequently, the court failed to enforce it as a “domestic contract” under
the Ontario Family Law Act.63 Far from seeing Mahr as the expression of
religious freedom that should be accommodated, the court declared the
agreement unenforceable precisely because of the religious dimension of
Mahr:
Because Mahr is a religious matter, the resolution of any dispute
relating to it or the consequences of failing to honour the obligation
are also religious in their content and context. . . . Many such
promises go well beyond the basic legal commitment to marriage
required by our civil law, and are essentially matters of chosen
religion and morality. They are derived from and are dependent upon
doctrine and faith. They bind the conscience as a matter of religious
64
principle but not necessarily as a matter of enforceable civil law.

On this basis, the court refused to recognize Mahr, stating “I don’t think,
even if I had received clear and complete Islamic doctrine from these experts,
that I could, as if applying foreign law, apply such religious doctrine to a civil
resolution of this dispute.”65
It is interesting to note that the court did grant the application for divorce—
but not Leila’s claim for deferred Mahr—even though the marriage was
concluded pursuant to the Muslim faith, and had its roots in the Quran.
This deeply contradictory treatment of Mahr by Canadian courts shows that
the secular Canadian law of residence at times drastically refuses and at times
wholly embraces Islamic legal norms, either as contracts or as religious
artifacts. As a result, Canadian conflict of laws rules66 do not offer secular
adjudication, nor do they give more predictability than the civil law
61

Id.
Kaddoura v. Hammoud, [1998] 168 D.L.R. 4th 503 (Can. Ont. Gen. Div.).
63 Id. paras. 23–24; see Family Law Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. F.3 (Can.).
64 Kaddoura, 168 D.L.R. 4th, para. 25.
65 Id. para. 27 (emphasis added).
66 Even though this Essay has focused on Canadian law, a similar argument can be made with regard to
other common law jurisdictions that apply the principle of lex domicilii to disputes of personal status, such as
the United States. See, e.g., FOURNIER, supra note 9, at 74–75 (analyzing the incorporation of Islamic legal
institutions into California and Florida family laws).
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jurisdictions of continental Europe. Given this state of affairs, it is not
surprising that husbands and wives strategize and play out these contradictions
in the reception of religious norms in all kinds of ways, some of which are
depicted in the next Subpart.
B. Bargaining in the Secular/Religious Interstices
In this Subpart, I go beyond judicial treatment of Islamic norms and the
locus of the state, and focus on the ways in which the parties themselves
navigate across the secular-religious divide.67 My aim is to move away from
religious “gendered images”68 or “symbolic roles” and portray women as
entering conflicting and multiple worlds of negotiation, as “bargaining with
patriarchy.”69
In this endeavor, one must bear in mind the internal plural bargaining
implications of Islamic law in general and Mahr in particular. In past work, I
have outlined that, far from being static and unitary, Mahr endows wife and
husband with diverging economic advantages in various circumstances.70
According to classical Islamic family law, women can initiate the Khul or
Faskh divorce, but may not use the Talaq divorce.71 Each scenario carries with
it not only different options for a woman exercising her right to divorce, but
also different implications as to her ability to keep the Mahr. The apparent
potential for extortion of the Talaq divorce has long been recognized in
religious and secular texts on Islamic divorce.72 However, the formally unequal
rule of Talaq will, in practice, play out differently depending on the amount
attached to Mahr in the marriage contract. Indeed, if Mahr is very high,
67 I draw inspiration from the epistemology of “Critical Legal Pluralism” and focus my work on Muslim
women’s “transformative capacity that enables them to produce legal knowledge and to fashion the very
structures of law that contribute to constituting their legal subjectivity.” Martha-Marie Kleinhans & Roderick
A. Macdonald, What is Critical Legal Pluralism?, 12 CAN. J.L. & SOC’Y 25, 38 (1997).
68 Ayelet Shachar, Privatizing Diversity: A Cautionary Tale from Religious Arbitration in Family Law, 9
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 573, 591 (2008). “[I]dealized and gendered images of women as mothers,
caregivers, educators, and moral guardians of the home come to represent the ultimate and inviolable
repository of ‘authentic’ group identity.” Id.
69 Deniz Kandiyoti, Bargaining with Patriarchy, 2 GENDER & SOC’Y 274 (1988). These bargaining
processes “exert a powerful influence on the shaping of women’s gendered subjectivity and determine the
nature of gender ideology in different contexts. They also influence both the potential for and specific forms of
women’s active or passive resistance in the face of their oppression.” Id. at 275. This is how I conceptualize
Muslim women’s oppression and agency.
70 FOURNIER, supra note 9, at 24–29.
71 See supra Part I.
72 See, e.g., J. Schacht, Talak, in 10 THE ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF ISLAM 151, 151–52 (P.J. Bearman et al.
eds., New ed. 2000).
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chances are the husband will hesitate before repudiating his wife.73 In most
cases, this will be a source of security for wives who do not want divorce.
Inversely, for those who do want a divorce, high Mahr can be disconcerting: it
will only be at the price of behaving in a disgraceful manner that the wife will
obtain a Talaq from her husband.74 Judith Tucker, in analyzing peasant women
in nineteenth-century Egypt, affirms, “many women who wanted a divorce
preferred that their husbands repudiate them” because of “the material
advantages of Ṭalāq.”75
Given this internally plural point of departure, it is not surprising to see
Talaq and Mahr come up as bargaining tools, raising distributional issues
across the frontier between secular and religious law. For example, they often
come into play regarding (secular) division of assets. In the British Columbia
Supreme Court case Elkaswani v. Elkaswani,76 a husband divorced his wife
under Islamic law.77 The husband had previously transferred the property of
the matrimonial home to his brother; upon petition for civil divorce, he came
close to arguing successfully that the home should not be subject to the
statutory division of property because the transfer of property was done in
accordance with the Islamic legal norm, according to which the wife has no
right to division of property.78 After conceding that, “[w]hile Canadian law
must govern the outcome of these proceedings, the actions of the parties cannot
be considered based solely on Canadian cultural values,”79 and that the
husband and his brother had indeed acted in conformity with “Islamic
precepts,”80 the court decided that because the property transfer aimed at
depriving the wife of her matrimonial claim, the house should nevertheless fall
under the statutory division of assets.81 These passages seem to indicate that
the strategy of invoking religious obligations to circumvent the civil regime
could have worked.

73 Homa Hoodfar, Circumventing Legal Limitation: Mahr and Marriage Negotiation in Egyptian LowIncome Communities, in 1 SHIFTING BOUNDARIES IN MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE IN MUSLIM COMMUNITIES:
SPECIAL DOSSIER 121, 131 (Homa Hoodfar et al. eds., 1996).
74 TUCKER, supra note 19, at 55.
75 Id.
76 Elkaswani v. Elkaswani, 2004 CarswellBC 798 (Can. B.C.) (WL).
77 See id. para. 57.
78 Id. paras. 56–58.
79 Id. para. 5.
80 Id. para. 57.
81 Id. para. 60.
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Likewise, the husband of one of the participants interviewed over the
course of my fieldwork82 proved adept at invoking both religious and civil
legal doctrines:
Well, here he used the civil, you know, provisions for a division of
property, you know, 50/50 division of property . . . . So when it was
convenient for him, he invoked the civil system, when it was
convenient for him, you know, he invoked . . . the religious system. It
83
is quite uncanny how he used both systems to his advantage.

In Kaddoura v. Hammoud, the court later filed additional reasons for its
decision granting husband’s petition for divorce, in which it acknowledged the
possibility for husbands to exploit the contradictory treatment of Mahr to gain
financially from the wife:
While I drew a boundary between a debt enforceable in civil law and
the obligation of the mahr, it nonetheless seems to me somewhat
offensive and dishonourable on the part of Mr. Kaddoura, to
knowingly participate in the wedding customs and practices of his
Muslim community, including the mahr which he clearly knew
included a “written” or deferred amount of $30,000, and then eschew
those customs and practices when they worked to his financial
84
detriment.

Furthermore, beyond this conventional bargaining over monetary matters, I
have found that the very granting of the Talaq by the husband and its
interactions with the civil divorce petition constitute another fertile bargaining
terrain. Because a Canadian judge cannot grant a religious divorce, women
generally must approach a Muslim leader or court (an imam or qadi,
respectively) to have religious recognition of their civil status.85 Otherwise, the

82 My current research project, entitled “Jewish and Muslim Women Negotiating Divorce in Western
Europe and Canada,” examines the ways in which religious women navigate in the interplay between legal
systems and religious norms in various multidimensional social and legal contexts. It does so through formal
interviews with Jewish and Muslim women in Canada, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom. This Essay
is based on my fieldwork with Muslim women in Canada, specifically in Toronto, Montreal, and Ottawa.
83 Interview with Participant No. 5, Female Muslim Study Participant, in Can. Due to a confidentiality
agreement, the participant’s name and the location and date of the interview cannot be revealed.
84 Kaddoura v. Hammoud, 1999 CarswellOnt 191, para. 6 (Can. Ont. Gen. Div.) (WL) (providing
additional reasons to the Dec. 3, 1998 decision).
85 However, there is no uniformity in how North American Muslim authorities consider and interact with
secular authorities. See Julie Macfarlane, Practicing an ‘Islamic Imagination’: Islamic Divorce in North
America, in DEBATING SHARIA: ISLAM, GENDER POLITICS AND FAMILY LAW ARBITRATION (Anna Korteweg &
Jennifer Selby eds., forthcoming 2011) (manuscript at 33, 42).
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husband can withhold the Talaq, which he has the sole power to issue.86
Muslim women in Canada can be adversely affected when they are divorced
civilly but not religiously. Without a religious divorce, they cannot remarry
within their faith. Because a Muslim woman can essentially ask for and receive
a civil divorce without the husband’s consent, the withholding of the religious
divorce then represents a negotiation instrument for the husband, as noted in
the Quebec Superior Court case S.I. c. E.E.:87
It was clear that for Mr. E., the granting or not of a religious divorce
was an important bargaining tool: he knew a religious divorce was
important for Ms. I. not only for religious reasons, but also for civil
reasons, as it would affect her civil status in Country A, where all her
family lives, i.e. father, siblings, cousins, etc., whom she had not seen
88
for many years.

Most interestingly, the religious status of the woman in S.I. c. E.E., while
ignored by Canadian law, still had civil effects in other jurisdictions and
affected her dealings with her country of origin. One of my interview
participants attested to this phenomenon:
[E]very time I wanted to get my Persian passport, I either had to
show my divorce paper or my husband had to sign the application,
because a woman cannot leave a country like Iran or a Muslim
country without her husband’s permission. So when you go to apply
for a passport, you either have to say I’m single or divorced and
prove that you are divorced, or your husband has to sign the form for
89
you.

Thus, what Canadian authorities may consider as strictly religious matters
can have repercussions on the very civil status of Muslim women, further
blurring the line between law and religion. Finally, in S.I. c. E.E., the husband
changed his mind about granting a religious divorce during the proceedings—
perhaps to show the court his good faith—and performed the triple Talaq in
front of the court, though it was necessary for him to register it at his country’s
consulate.90 His promise to register the divorce then formed part of the

86

DAVID PEARL & WERNER MENSKI, MUSLIM FAMILY LAW 280 (3d ed. 1998).
S.I. c. E.E., 2005 CarswellQue 8765 (Can. Que. Super. Ct.).
88 Id. para. 65.
89 Interview with Participant No. 7, Female Muslim Study Participant, in Can. Due to a confidentiality
agreement, the participant’s name and the location and date of the interview cannot be revealed.
90 S.I. c. E.E., 2005 CarswellQue 8765, para. 66. The name of the country has been removed from the
judgment to protect the parties’ identities.
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judgment,91 creating a puzzling mix of civil and religious commitments and
bargaining chips.
Interestingly, rather than having the religious divorce refused, one of my
study participants went through the reverse scenario. Her husband divorced her
by pronouncing the Talaq, and later remarried, despite the absence of a civil
divorce:
[H]e remarried, and we had had no civil divorce. He had pronounced,
you know, “I will divorce you” three times, Islamicly, supposedly in
January and by Easter, that’s in April the same year, he married. He
got married to another woman while he was still married to
me. . . . He wanted me to be his second wife, so I said: “What? First
of all, how can you be married? You are not divorced, you know, we
are not legally divorced. You cannot be legally married!” He said:
“Oh no, no, no! I am Islamicly married and according to Islam, I can
92
have more than one wife.”

The Divorce Act required that the spouses live separately for at least one
year before the divorce petition.93 This requirement, which does not exist in
Islamic law, provides husbands with opportunities to circumvent the civil
regime by repudiating their wives long before a civil divorce becomes
available.
That being said, the results of this sometimes-vicious bargaining process
are not always so straightforwardly oppressive to women. One study
participant related how her husband, whom she had divorced civilly (although
he never attended court and did not recognize the legitimacy of the divorce),
continued to withhold the religious divorce. However, she had no desire to
remarry, and the lack of religious divorce thus gave him no negotiating power:
He said, “Well, I will never divorce you. You will never get
married.” I said, “First of all, I am not planning on getting married
and if I do find somebody that I care for, I will go with [him].” I
don’t care. I mean, according to Muslim religion I cannot [be in that
relationship]. If I go with somebody, my punishment is stoning to
death, so it’s a serious offense I think. If I have a boyfriend or
something, I think he would divorce me because that would bother

91

Id. paras. 117–18.
Interview with Participant No. 5, Female Muslim Study Participant, in Can. Due to a confidentiality
agreement, the participant’s name and the location and date of the interview cannot be revealed.
93 Divorce Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. L-3, § 8(1)–8(2)(a) (Can.). However, in cases of adultery or cruel
treatment, this requirement does not apply. Id. § 8(2)(b).
92
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him that because he still claims that he is in love with me and he still
thinks that is the biggest sin you can commit, so to prevent me from
94
committing a big sin, I think he would divorce me.

Should her priorities change, however, she could find herself in a position
where she must test her theory of how much her former husband values her
religious well-being.95
Upon divorce, a Canadian Muslim woman is faced with a puzzling
dilemma, which only highlights the complex relationship between the secular
and religious spheres: under the (secular) family law regime, she may divorce
her husband without his consent, whereas under Islamic (religious) law,
circumstances may dictate that she remain involuntarily married to him. For
example, Participant No. 7 wanted her husband to pronounce the Talaq.
However, his failure to do so did not detract from her enjoying membership in
the communities of her choosing. This situation contrasts markedly with the
position of Participant No. 5, whose husband pronounced the Talaq suddenly,
remarried (religiously) without notice, and withheld the civil divorce until he
could manipulate both the religious and civil systems.
CONCLUSION
In this Essay, I have presented the continental European paradox of having
a restrictive naturalization policy yet emphasizing the principle of lex patriae.
Although common law jurisdictions such as Canada might have appeared to
apply domestic (secular) laws, I have demonstrated that the religious penetrates
the secular through several unexpected channels. The case law, the literature,
and my interviews with Muslim Canadian women illustrate the manifold ways
in which Muslim marriages and divorces are translated into the Canadian legal
order, without direct application of foreign legal systems through conflict of
laws. This belies the assumption that applying the principle of lex domicilii
allows immigrants to integrate better and allows women to fare better than
under foreign Islamic legal systems. By understanding women’s agency—how
94 Interview with Participant No. 7, Female Muslim Study Participant, in Can. Due to a confidentiality
agreement, the participant’s name and the location and date of the interview cannot be revealed.
95 The Parliament of Canada has provided women like our participant with one more (secular) tool to
force the (religious) divorce; allowing women to file an affidavit with the court concerning any barriers to their
religious remarriage, such as withholding of the Talaq divorce. Divorce act, § 21.1(2). The Divorce Act further
allows the court to dismiss applications made pursuant to the act by the withholding spouse. Id. § 21.1(3)(c).
This provision highlights the irreversible intertwinement of the Canadian religious and secular spheres and the
resulting myriad bargaining chips available to husbands and wives.
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they use the law as it lives out in the real world—this Essay has examined how
Muslim women navigate in the interstices of legal systems and religious norms
and circumvent Western conflict of laws doctrines.
As recognized by Justice Abella of the Supreme Court of Canada,
acknowledging the organic interplay between religion and civil law does not
amount to “an unwarranted secular trespass into religious fields, nor does it
amount to judicial sanction of the vagaries of an individual’s religion. In
deciding cases involving freedom of religion, the courts cannot ignore
religion.”96 I would broaden this statement and argue that religion can never be
stripped out of any of the disputes I have presented, whether freedom of
religion is invoked or not. Furthermore, I agree with Prakash Shah that religion
is an inherently plural concept, which can be invoked and understood in ways
that are utterly foreign to Western observers’ understanding of it.97 Thus, the
research agenda must extend beyond the indeterminacy of adjudication98 to
account for the indeterminacy of religion and the multiple ways in which it can
be invoked in Western courts. In this context, the idea of eschewing doctrinal
consistency in favor of party autonomy and optio juris, as put forward by
Marie-Claire Foblets,99 can have some appeal, for example to contextualize
conflict of laws rules and adapt them to plural, complex situations. However,
as I have attempted to demonstrate, the very idea of applying coherently only
one legal system, whether designated by conflict of laws doctrines or chosen
by the parties, is proving more and more to be a fantasy.100 Can one escape this

96

Marcovitz v. Bruker, [2007] 3 S.C.R. 607, para. 18 (Can.).
See, e.g., Prakash Shah, Religion in a Super-Diverse Legal Environment: Thoughts on the British
Scene, in LAW AND RELIGION IN MULTICULTURAL SOCIETIES 63 (Rubya Mehdi et al. eds., 2008); Prakash
Shah, Thinking Beyond Religion: Legal Pluralism in Britain’s South Asian Diaspora, 8 AUSTL. J. ASIAN L.
237 (2006).
98 For a discussion of the indeterminacy of adjudication, see DUNCAN KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE OF
ADJUDICATION (1997).
99 Marie-Claire Foblets, Migrant Women Caught Between Islamic Family Law and Women’s Rights. The
Search for the Appropriate ‘Connecting Factor’ in International Family Law, 7 MAASTRICHT J. EUR. & COMP.
L. 11, 29–33 (2000).
100 I extend this proposition to legal systems chosen by the courts on an ad hoc basis as well. Juenger
criticizes the principle of lex patriae and proposes, instead of the classical lex domicilii alternative, a
“substantive approach” that selects the connecting factor in light of the fairness of the foreseen result. See
JUENGER, supra note 3, at 220. This approach is often touted as an alternative to the lex domicilii–lex patriae
dilemma. See Symeon C. Symeonides, General Report, in PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW AT THE END OF THE
20TH CENTURY: PROGRESS OR REGRESS? 3, 25 (Symeon C. Symeonides ed., 2000). In my opinion, this
approach does not set aside the entanglement I routinely come across in my work and which I tried to outline
in this Essay.
97
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entanglement? Perhaps secularism should recognize its own religious shadow,
and vice versa, so that a new fruitful paradigm can emerge.

